概要・趣旨
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要旨:
The question of whether artificial intelligence (AI) can be a person remains a subject of vigorous debate among scholars. Many have argued that AI can be a person if it acts, communicates, and solves problems just as a human does; to treat it differently, some contend, is mere biological bias. Furthermore, it has been claimed that AI's capacity to pass complex cognitive tests suggests that internal cognitive tests can no longer serve as a yardstick for measuring who counts as a person.
Others argue that AI exhibits autonomy and action that mirror a kind of self-directed agency once thought to be exhibited by humans alone. Connected to this last claim is the further contention that AI, though non-sentient, may nonetheless possess some degree of moral capacity. In this presentation, I argue that these arguments fail to capture what makes something essentially a person. Functional, cognitive, and agential considerations do not constitute person; there are other core ontological conditions that must be satisfied.
Accordingly, this presentation examines these ontological elements from the standpoint of the Akan conceptual scheme.
キーワード：Artificial Intelligence (AI); Personhood; Ontology; Akan Philosophy; Agency
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